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Abstract
This paper studies shifts in the consumption bundle when consumption is subject to habit
formation, and consumers do not internalize this habit formation process. Habits are good-
specific, or ’deep’, and cause persistence in good-specific consumption. In addition, at the
aggregate level, habits act as benchmark against which consumption is evaluated. I establish
that a rapid transition is optimal if the persistence effect is relatively strong, and determine
the path of taxes or subsidies that implements this transition, both when goods are produced
competitively and when they are produced by monopolists. To explore the quantitative impli-
cations of the model I consider the introduction of a 10 percent charge on a subset of goods. I
find that consumption adjusts inefficiently fast; implementing first-best adjustment requires a
transitory discount of up to 60 percent of the cost increase.
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1 Introduction
A rapidly expanding literature in behavioral economics documents how consumer preferences and
rationality deviate from ’standard’ neoclassical assumptions.1 Preferences for instance, are shaped
by context and reference points. I consider the specific case of habit formation, where utility
from consumption depends on habits (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Rabin, 2002). As habits
only slowly catch up with actual consumption, consumption patterns become persistent. People
however have difficulty anticipating such future preference changes. This is known as projection
bias, and implies individuals do not appropriately internalize the effects of current consumption
decisions on future demand and welfare (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Loewenstein et al.,
2000; DellaVigna, 2009). Against this backdrop, a question arises whether fiscal policies can
improve welfare by correcting this habit internality. This question has relevance especially where
policymakers foresee or manage a change in consumption patterns.
Several imminent changes in consumption patterns can be identified across the globe. In 2014,
droughts and water shortages were reported from Australia to California and Tehran to São Paulo.
Many of these areas have a long history with droughts. Yet, more intensive agriculture and pop-
ulation growth increase the difficulty of dealing with ensuing water shortages. In California for
instance, water shortages during the 2011-2017 drought led farmers to increasingly rely on the
already dwindling groundwater stock, and reservoir water levels fell below 60 percent of aver-
age levels (State of California, 2015; The New York Times, 2015). Combating water shortages
and preventing an irreversible depletion of groundwater resources required, and will continue to
require, a substantial reduction in water use by the agricultural sector and households.
More generally, both in the past and future, people’s diets have and will be subject to con-
stant shocks and changes. Examples are numerous here. Collapsing ocean fish stock will force
consumers to shift their diets away from the most-prized species. So-called ’fat’ and ’sugar’ taxes
have been the subject of debate in many countries. Several government have introduced such taxes,
as a measure to induce consumers to adopt a healthier diet.2 Similar examples can be found in other
areas. For instance, congestion and more stringent local pollution policies will require urbanites
to abandon their gas-guzzling vehicle for a more efficient one, shift to public transport or even a
bicycle. Stringent climate policies can contribute to this trend, and bring an end to an era of cheap
energy.
When habits cause consumption persistence, such shifts in consumption patterns will not come
about from one day to another. Rather, following a shock to relative goods prices, consumption,
and habits, will only gradually adjust. In this context, the question is whether from a welfare
1For example Rabin (2002), Tirole (2002), DellaVigna (2009) and Samson (2014).
2See for instance The Washington Post (2012) and The Guardian (2016). Smed (2012) discusses the specific case
of the Danish fat tax (which was later scrapped).
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perspective, such a shift in consumption patterns is too slow, or still too fast. Correspondingly, is
a policy that further smooths this change in consumption welfare-improving, or should policy be
used to implement a faster transition?
In this paper, I answer this question. I put forward a simple model of habit formation. In this
model, a representative consumer forms habits at the level of individual goods. These good-specific
habits cause persistence in consumption patterns. At the aggregate level, habits form a benchmark
against which consumption is evaluated. This benchmark, which slowly adjust to consumption,
causes any increase in utility due to an increase in the consumption level to fade over time; as the
consumer get used to a higher consumption level she loses (part of) her appreciation for it. The
consumer does not internalize that current consumption affects future habits and thereby future
demand and welfare. Consumption decisions may therefore deviate from the optimal path, which
is defined as the path that maximizes welfare, taking into account the endogenous formation of
habits.
As all goods are subject to habits, habits provide no reason to subsidize consumption of one
good relative to another in steady state. However, habits do affect the optimal adjustment path of
consumption towards a new bundle. This optimal transition is faster the stronger are habits at the
good-specific level vis-a-vis the aggregate level. At the good-specific level, the consumer prefers
to consume goods she has a high habit in. As a consequence, as she does not internalize that current
consumption affects future habits, she keeps ’too high’ habits for those goods consumption shifts
away from. A faster transition thus improves welfare. At the aggregate level however, the transition
offers an opportunity to manage the habit benchmark against which consumption is evaluated. A
slow transition, which implies the consumer consumes to a relatively ’inefficient’ bundle for a
longer period of time, lowers this benchmark, and is thus beneficial.
The optimal consumption path can be implemented by temporary, or transitory, fiscal policy.
A positive tax on those goods consumption shift away from speeds up the transition, while a
subsidy slows it down. The exact path of taxes and subsidies then depends on whether goods
are produced under perfect competition or by monopolists. In the latter case, forward-looking
producers invest in habits. An anticipated drop in demand reduces the value of this investment,
and increases the markup charged by monopolists. This price response speeds up the transition
to the new consumption bundle compared to the competitive market. Hence, I find that while
taxes might still be called for under perfect competition, transitory subsidies are always required
to implement the optimal consumption path under monopolists.
To illustrate the mechanisms and quantify effects, I evaluate the implications of an unantic-
ipated shock to production costs. More specifically, I consider the introduction of a 10 percent
charge on ’unhealthy foods’, which induces consumption to shift to away from these goods. Here
I determine the transition when goods are produced by perfectly competitive firms or monopolists,
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as well as the optimal transition. I find the latter to be relatively slow; relative consumption drops
by about 11 percent at the onset of the shift, and it takes more than 10 years for the economy
to converge to the new steady-state. Implementing this path requires sizable policy intervention;
initial charges are set to about 40 to 60 percent of the long-run optimal charge. Appropriately man-
aging this transition reduces transition costs by up to 5 percent. Immediately setting the charge at
the long run level however has the advantage of being simple and straightforward to implement. I
propose two alternative simple policy rules which generate welfare levels close to the one under
the optimal path.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature.
The model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the equilibrium, including the steady
state. The transition path towards this steady state is discussed in Section 5. Optimal steady-
state adjustment and policy are presented in Section 6, and Section 7 deals with the numerical
application. Section 8 concludes. Detailed derivations, proofs, a model extension, and further
details to Section 7 can be found in Appendices A through C.
2 Literature
Early theoretical contributions on habit formation have been made by Pollak (1970), Ryder and
Heal (1973), Becker and Murphy (1988) and Abel (1990). The work by Pollak (1970), and later
Carroll (2000) and Hiraguchi (2008), focuses on the properties of demand functions with habit for-
mation. The implications of habit formation have been explored in fields as diverse as asset pricing
(Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), growth (Ryder and Heal, 1973;
Carroll et al., 2000; Alvarez-Cuadrado et al., 2004; Alonso-Carrera et al., 2005), addiction (Becker
and Murphy, 1988), life cycle consumption and savings (Cremer et al., 2010; Koehne and Kuhn,
2014) and the relationship between income and happiness (Layard, 2006; Choudhary et al., 2012).
In these fields, habits have been put forward as an explanation for multiple ’puzzles’, such as the
equity premium puzzle (Abel, 1990; Constantinides, 1990; Campbell and Cochrane, 1999), the
observation that growth Granger causes savings (Carroll and Weil, 1994; Carroll et al., 2000) and
the Easterlin paradox (Choudhary et al., 2012). Including habits in monetary policy and DSGE
models allows these models to capture certain features of the macroeconomy, such as the grad-
ual response of real spending to shocks (Fuhrer, 2000) and counter-cyclical markups (Ravn et al.,
2006). Also empirical research generally confirms the presence of habit formation in consumption.
Bronnenberg et al. (2012) for instance, find that endogenous brand preferences explain 40 percent
of the geographic variation in market shares. Carrasco et al. (2005) test for habits formation in
food, services and transport. They find evidence for habits in food and services; accounting for
individual fixed effects, a 1 percent increase in past consumptions of food and services increases
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current consumption by 0.72 and 0.14 percent respectively.3
Empirical evidence from psychology and behavioral economics indicates that consumers are
not fully rational with respect to observing and anticipating the habit formation process. Instead,
individuals suffer from projection bias, i.e. they fail to fully anticipate preference shifts (Frederick
and Loewenstein, 1999; Loewenstein et al., 2000; Conlin et al., 2007).4 This opens up room
for welfare-improving policy intervention. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) for instance, show that
habits provide a rationale for procyclical taxes, as such taxes counter the tendency to build up
’too high’ habits during booms. In the context of growth, Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005), Turnovsky
and Monteiro (2007) and Monteiro et al. (2013) characterize the income and consumption tax
rates that implement the optimal path of consumption as the economy transitions to the balanced
growth path. In Cremer et al.’s (2010) two-period model with retirement, habit formation and
myopia cause overconsumption and undersaving in the first period of life. A tax on first-period
consumption and a lump-sum transfers then implements the first-best allocation. If lump-sum
transfers are infeasible, the second-best policy will also have redistributive implications. This
paper contributes to this literature, which evaluates the implications of habit formation for optimal
(tax) policy when consumers do not fully internalize the habit formation process.5
With the exception of the work by Ravn et al. (2006), the theoretical research cited above
assumes habits form at the level of aggregate consumption instead of individual goods. Hence,
this research cannot address the implications of habit formation for shifts within the consumption
bundle. To my knowledge, I am the first to evaluate the potential policy implications of habit
formation when habits are formed at the good-specific level. The distinction between aggregate
(superficial) and good-specific (deep) habits was first made by Ravn et al. (2006), who studies the
implications of the latter. When habits form at the level of individual goods, strategic behavior
by firms becomes relevant; a central result of Ravn et al. (2006) is that deep habits give rise to
countercyclical markup behavior. In Ravn et al. (2010), the authors more closely assess the pass-
through of marginal cost shocks and establish that pass-through is increasing in the persistence of
3See also Dynan (2000), Ravina (2005), Dubé et al. (2010), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2012), Atkin (2013) and
Verhelst and Van den Poel (2014). All except Dynan (2000) find evidence for habit formation. This literature is
discussed in more detail in Section 7.
4From a modeling perspective, projection bias blurs the distinction between habit formation when habits are formed
internally and own past consumption acts as a reference point, or externally, where the reference point depends on past
consumption of a peer group (also known as ’catching up with the Joneses’). In both cases, external habits and internal
habits with projection bias, the consumer does not internalize the habit formation process. For this reason, both the
literature on, and policy implications of, internal and external habit formation are relevant to this paper and thus
considered. See also Section 3.
5More generally, I contribute to a broader literature in ’behavioral public economics’, which evaluates the policy
implications of non-standard (behavioral) assumptions. Examples of such behavioral assumptions include projection
bias considered here, but also hyperbolic discounting, reference-dependent preferences, overconfidence, and limited
attention (DellaVigna, 2009). See for instance O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) on optimal policy under hyperbolic
discounting and Bernheim and Rangel (2007) and Dalton and Ghosal (2011) for a general discussion.
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cost shocks, and may even exceed a 100 percent. Such ’excessive’ pass-through is also a feature
of my setup, and will tend to speed up shifts within the consumption bundle.
The deep habits specifications formulated by Ravn et al. (2006), and subsequently used by
Doi and Mino (2008), Ravn et al. (2010) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2011), do not separate the
two effects of habit formation; the presence of good-specific habits reduces (steady-state) welfare
whenever habits lead to persistence in consumption, and vice versa. I propose a specification that
separates these two effects. This allows me to more closely evaluate the importance of these effects
and their relative strength in determining the optimal adjustment path of consumption. In addition,
my specification unites the deep habits approach of Ravn et al. (2010) with the mainstream aggre-
gate habits specification adopted by for instance Abel (1990) and Monteiro et al. (2013).
As argued in the introduction, consumption patterns can change for many reasons. Several of
those reasons relate to resource scarcity and environmental externalities. In this context, this paper
contributes to a more specialized literature that assesses the optimal time path of environmental
taxes, and carbon taxes in particular. In this literature, numerous rationales for time-varying taxes
have been proposed, ranging from innovation externalities (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Gerlagh et al.,
2009) to issues related to resource scarcity and the so-called green paradox (Ulph and Ulph, 1994;
Sinn, 2008). Here, this paper provides an additional, previously uninvestigated, rationale for time-
varying environmental taxes: habits. Appendix B explicates how the framework can be extended
to and interpreted in this context.
3 Model
I consider a simple setup in which a representative consumer consumes a variety of goods ci(t),
with i 2 [0, 1] and where t denotes time. The consumer forms habits hi (t) over the same varieties.
These good-specific, or ’deep’, habits cause persistence in consumption decisions: demand for
good ci(t) is increasing in habit hi(t). Consumption and habits are aggregated into C(t) and H(t).
The representative consumer’s instantaneous utilityU(t) at time t increases in effective consump-
tion C(t), and C(t) relative to a benchmark, the aggregate habit H(t). The higher this benchmark,
the lower is utility from consumption. Hence, the aggregate habit causes some degree of hedonic
adaptation: the utility gain from a permanent increase in consumption (partly) fades out over time
as consumers become accustomed to the higher consumption level.6 Note that in the remainder, I
omit time from notation when convenient.
Instantaneous utility reads
6The hedonic treadmill, or hedonic adaptation, is a concept from psychology which describes the tendency for
humans to quickly return to a relatively stable level of happiness following a major positive or negative life event
(Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).
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U(t) =
⇣
C(t)1 g
⇣
C(t)
H(t)
⌘g⌘1 s
1 s , (1)
where s > 0 is the (negative) elasticity of marginal utility when habits are exogenous. The parame-
ter g is the aggregate habit strength, and measures the importance of the aggregate habit benchmark
in utility. Here I set g 2 [0,1]. Effective consumption is an aggregate of consumption over a variety
of goods ci. The importance of each variety inC depends on (endogenous) good-specific consump-
tion weights wi. These weights in turn depend on habits; a higher good-specific habit relative to
the aggregate habit increases the weight of a good ci inC:
C(t) =
Z 1
0
wi(t)ci(t)
h 1
h di
  h
h 1
, (2)
and
wi(t) =
✓
hi(t)
H(t)
◆ q
h
. (3)
Here, h is the instantaneous elasticity of substitution across varieties and q 2 [0,1) is the good-
specific habit strength. Deep habits, at the level of individual varieties, increase demand for specific
varieties as they increase these varieties’ weight in the consumption aggregate. Note that the ag-
gregation from ci toC preserves linear homogeneity: a proportional increase in all ci translates into
an equiproportional increase in C. The aggregate habit is a measure for the effective consumption
level the consumer is accustomed to and defined as follows
H(t) =
Z 1
0
wi(t)hi(t)
h 1
h di
  h
h 1
. (4)
H is linearly homogeneous in good-specific habits hi which implies consumption weights are in-
dependent of the scaling of the habit. A proportional increase in all habits hi thus reduces utility
only through an increase the aggregate habit benchmark H; it does not alter effective consumption
C. Similarly, a shift in good-specific habits, keeping the aggregate habit H constant, only affects
utility through its effect on the good-specific consumption weights wi and effective consumption
C. Such a shift in good-specific habits will increase effective consumptionC if it brings the pattern
of habits more in line with the pattern of consumption.7 If consumption and habits are uniform
across varieties, we have H = hi, wi = 1 andC = ci.
7This can be illustrated by the following example. Consider a consumption bundle that is high in vegetables and
low in meat. Then effective consumption C derived from this bundle is higher if the consumer is used to this high
vegetable, low meat diet, than if she were used to a low vegetable, high meat diet. Both diet habits however, could
resemble the same standard of living, i.e. the same H.
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Good-specific habits slowly catch up with consumption:
h˙i(t) = x (ci(t) hi(t)) , (5)
where the dot denotes a time derivative and x > 0 is the adjustment speed of the habit. In steady-
state, habits have converged to actual consumption: hi = ci. From (2) and (4) it then also follows
that in steady state, the aggregate habit equals effective consumption: H =C.
The specification above allows me to disentangle two effects of habits. First, q measures the
degree to which habits cause persistence in good-specific consumption. The higher is q , the more
responsive is the consumption weight wi to a change in good-specific habits hi. Then, as will
become clear in the next section, a higher q implies greater persistence in consumption patterns.
If q = 0, such consumption choices are independent of good-specific habits, and (2) collapses
to the standard Dixit-Stiglitz specification. Second, g measures the degree to which, over time,
consumers adapt to changes in effective consumptionC. The higher is g , the more important is the
aggregate habit benchmark in welfare. If g = 1, changes in consumption do not lead to long-term
utility gains or losses. With g = 0, aggregate habits do not affect utility fromC.
For production, I assume a constant returns to scale production technology, where the produc-
tion of each good requires di > 0 units of labor. Total labor supply, L, is fixed, so that the labor
market equilibrium reads as follows
L=
Z 1
0
dici(t)di. (6)
In addition to the direct labor cost of production, producers may face a good-specific production
tax. I denote the wage rate by pL. To the producer, the total cost of producing one unit of ci then
equals di pL(t)ti(t) where ti(t) is the gross tax rate; for ti(t) > 1, good i production is subject to
a positive tax, and good i is subsidized if ti(t) < 1. Tax receipts are rebated though a lump-sum
transfer (which is negative in case total receipts are negative).
Finally, I make two assumptions regarding the rationality of the consumer and producers:
Assumption 1 The representative consumer is subject to strong projection bias, i.e. it does not
internalize the effect of current consumption on future habits.
Projection bias is a form of limited rationality where individuals do not (fully) anticipate future
changes in preferences (Loewenstein et al., 2000; Samson, 2014). As a consequence, in the face
of changing preferences, the individual is unable to fully optimize its consumption decisions. In
the context of the current framework, this implies that demand is a function of the goods’ current
prices and habits, but not on future expected prices.
8
Assumption 2 Producers are forward-looking and atomistic.
Contrary to the consumer, producers do anticipate that current consumption affects future de-
mand through habits. Hence, they adjust their optimization accordingly. Their atomistic size
however implies that even though producers internalize the direct effect of ci(t) on the evolution
of the good-specific habit hi(t), they do not internalize the subsequent effect on the aggregate
habit H(t).8 As we will see below, habits affect the price charged by monopolists. If markets are
perfectly competitive, goods are always sold at marginal costs.
Catching up with the Joneses In terms of modeling, the internal habit formation framework
presented above is virtually equivalent to a setup which instead features ’catching up with the
Joneses’, as in Abel (1990), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) and Alonso-Carrera et al. (2005). In
such a setup, hi(t) represents an external habit, i.e., a reference point based on (past) consumption
in the peer group. To the individual consumer, this habit is exogenous. With a representative
consumer, one can show hi still evolves according to (5).9 In the remainder of the paper, I continue
to interpret hi as an internal habit where the consumer does not internalize the habit formation
process. All results and policy recommendations continue to apply if habits are instead formed
externally as described above.
4 Equilibrium
The representative consumer maximizes instantaneous utility while taking habits as given. This
gives demand
ci(t) =
✓
pi(t)
P(t)
◆ h✓hi(t)
H(t)
◆q
C(t), (7)
where pi is the price of good i and
P(t) =
"Z 1
0
✓
hi(t)
H(t)
◆q
pi(t)1 hdi
# 1
1 h
(8)
is the price of effective consumption. Demand for good i decreases in the price of good i and
increases in effective consumption C. For given aggregate habit H, a higher good-specific habit hi
8This implication is akin to the notion that monopolistically competitive firms internalize the effect of output on
the good-specific price, but not on the aggregate price level in the economy.
9More specifically, let j be the indicator for the consumer, such that c ji(t) is the time t good i consumption of
individual j 2 [0,J]. Then (2) can be rephrased asCj(t) =
hR 1
0 wi(t)c ji(t)
h 1
h di
i h
h 1
. (3)-(5) still apply, where in (5) ci
is now redefined as ci(t)⌘
R J
0 c ji(t)d j. In a representative consumer setting,Cj(t) then collapses toC(t) as in (2).
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increases the weight of consumption ci in C (see (2)). As a consequence, demand increases in the
good-specific habit. This in turn also increases the weight of the good i price in the price aggregate
P. In the remainder, I take effective consumption as the numeraire, and thus normalize P = 1.
Through the representative consumer budget constraint, expendituresCmust equal income: C(t) =h
pL(t)L+
R 1
0 pi(t)di+W(t)
i
, where W(t) =
R 1
0 (ti(t) 1)di pL(t)ci(t)di is a lump-sum transfer.
On the producer side, price-setting is straightforward if markets are perfectly competitive. In
this case we have
pi(t) = di pL(t)ti(t). (9)
If the producers are monopolists in their respective goods, each chooses a series of prices that
maximizes its firm value Vi, which is equal to the present value of profits, discounted according
to market interest rates Vi(t) =
R •
t e
 R nt r(x)dxci(n) [pi(n) di pL(n)ti(n)]dn , with ci given by (7).
Producers anticipate that a reduction in the current prices does not only increase current sales, but
also, through habits, future demand and profits. Setting a low price to build habit can thus be
considered an investment in future profits. Hence, habits are expected to reduce markups, which is
confirmed by the following result for the monopolist pricing rule:10
pi =
h
h 1 [di pL(t)ti(t) xkhi(t)] , (10)
where
khi(t) =
Z •
t
e 
R n
t (r(x)+x )dx q
h
ci (n)
hi (n)
pi (n)dn , (11)
and I require h > 1 to ensure positive steady-state markups. The standard monopolistic compe-
tition pricing rule now includes a habit discount, xkhi . The size of this discount depends on the
shadow value of the habit to the monopolist, khi , multiplied by the direct effect of an increase in
consumption on the future habit, x . The monopolist sets a low price if investing in the habit is
valuable, i.e. if the shadow value of the habit is high. This is the case if (future) demand is very
sensitive to the habit (high qci/hi) and prices are high (high pi). A low elasticity of substitution h
then implies markups are high, and a large share of this price constitute pure profits. Future returns
are discounted at a rate r+x , where a higher discount rate reduces the shadow value of the habit.
This is due to the fact that a low persistence of the habit (high x ) reduces the marginal effect of an
increase in ci today on habits further in the future, while higher discount rates reduce the present
value of a given flow of returns.
Habits do not only lead to lower markups, but also to time varying markups. This can be
seen as follows. Suppose that pi is constant, and we initially have hi < ci. Then as habits catch
10See Appendix A.1 for detailed derivations.
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up with consumption, ci/hi falls and so does the shadow value of the habit. This increases the
monopolist’s price according to (10) and is thus inconsistent with the constant price just assumed.
The interest rate r is determined endogenously by the consumption Euler equation, which ensures
optimal smoothing of (expected) marginal utility over time: r(t) = r  Erc
h
d
dt
⇣
dU(t)
dC(t)
⌘
/dU(t)dC(t)
i
,
where Erc [·] is the expectation from the perspective of the representative consumer.11
4.1 Steady state
The economy is in steady state if prices, consumption and habits are constant over time. Then, by
(5), for all goods i 2 [0,1], habits must equal consumption: c⇤i = h⇤i . Here, the star indicates we are
in steady state. Then, by (2) and (4), it follows that in steady state also the aggregate habit equals
effective consumption: C⇤ = H⇤, and the market interest rate equals the rate of time preference r .
Then, the good i steady-state price under perfect competition equals
p⇤i = di p⇤Lt⇤i . (12)
To the monopolist, the steady-state shadow value of the habit is
k⇤hi =
1
r+x
q
h
p⇤i , (13)
which with (10) gives the following steady state price:
p⇤i = di p⇤Lt⇤i
h
h 1
24 r+x
r+x
⇣
1+ qh 1
⌘
35 . (14)
Even though habits reduce the monopoly markup in steady state, the markup remains positive.12
As I abstract from saving and assume labor supply is fixed, consumption decisions are fully de-
termined by relative prices. In the remainder of the paper, for ease of exposition and to stress this
point, I will mostly focus on prices and quantities of a good i relative to some ’base’ good b2 [0,1].
From (7), steady-state relative consumption then reads
cR⇤i =
 
pR⇤i
   h1 q , (15)
11Since none of the theoretical results in the remainder of the text rely on whether the consumer’s expectations with
respect to the evolution ofH are rational or not, I make no further assumptions here. If the consumer does not anticipate
the evolution of H, which is the assumption I consider most in line with Assumption 1, then r(t) r = sC˙(t)/C(t).
12The monopoly markup is positive if hh 1
r+x
r+x
⇣
1+ qh 1
⌘ > 1. This condition can be rearranged to r > x (q  1). As
q < 1 and r , x > 0, this condition is always satisfied.
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with cRi ⌘ ci/cb and pRi ⌘ pi/pb. The steady-state relative price is independent of market structure:
pR⇤i = dRi tR⇤i , (16)
where dRi and tRi are defined in line with cRi and pRi . Then by (6) I arrive at the following solution
for steady-state consumption of good i:
c⇤i = cR⇤i
hR 1
0 dicR⇤i di
i 1
L. (17)
In turn
C⇤ =
Z 1
0
 
cR⇤i
 h 1+q
h di
  h
h 1+q Z 1
0
dicR⇤i di
  1
L, (18)
and
U⇤ =
(C⇤)(1 g)(1 s)
1 s . (19)
The steady state is interior and unique only if demand is strictly concave in the good-specific habit,
i.e. only if q < 1. This condition is easily derived from (7). For a given set of prices, consumption
scales with the habit at degree q . If relative consumption, cRi , rises by 1 percent, future habits
follow, and in turn future relative consumption goes up by an additional q percent. The long run
increase in cRi is then bounded only if q < 1.
This observation is mirrored in the result for the long run price elasticity of demand. With
good-specific habit formation, the long run price elasticity of demand exceeds the short run one.
This can be seen by comparing equations (7) and (15). From (7), the (absolute value of) the short
run price elasticity of demand is equal to the instantaneous elasticity of substitution across goods:
eSRp = h . In the long run, this price elasticity of (relative) demand is eLRp = h/(1 q) (see (15)).
In the absence of good-specific persistence (q = 0) these elasticities are equal. For positive q , the
long run shift in consumption in response to a permanent change in relative prices exceeds the
short run one: eLRp > eSRp . If q = 1, eLRp is unbounded, implying that, in the long run, goods act
as perfect substitutes. As a consequence, not all goods may be consumed in steady state, and the
relevant steady state would depend on initial values of the hi. As stated in Section 3, I assume
q 2 [0,1), which rules out such indeterminacy.
A change in the steady-stateCwill only affect steady-state utility if the aggregate habit strength,
g , lies below 1 (see (19)). If g = 0, aggregate habits do not affect utility for a given level of effective
consumption C. If g = 1, utility only depends on the level of effective consumption relative to the
habit: C/H. As habits catch up with consumption, welfare will then always return to a stable
long-run level.
Finally, in steady state, due to uniform markups, the relative price pRi is independent of whether
goods are produced under perfect competition or by monopolists. Outside of steady state however,
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the relative price set by monopolists diverges from the perfect competition price ratio (see (9) and
(10)). As will be shown in Section 5.2, this gives two distinct transition paths of consumption
towards a steady-state equilibrium.
5 Transition
With habit formation, consumption need not always be in steady state. When consumption lies
above or below the habit, the habit will change over time, affecting future demand and possibly
prices. Starting in a steady state, any shock to production costs, either through a shock to the unit
labor requirement di, or a permanent change in taxes ti, will cause consumption to deviate from
the habit.
Consider for instance a permanent increase in the cost of energy. This cost shock could be due
to the introduction of an economy-wide carbon tax, a shutdown of coal or nuclear power plants,
or import restrictions on oil or gas implemented for geopolitical reasons. Also developments un-
related to a particular country’s policies, such as increased global energy demand, or the depletion
of oil and gas reserves will likely confront consumers with higher prices for energy. Such a perma-
nent increase in energy cost, and correspondingly steady-state prices for energy-intensive goods,
induces consumption to shift away from these goods. With slow habit adjustment, consumption of
energy-intensive goods will then fall short of the habit and the consumption may require time to
fully adjust to the lower-energy bundle. A qualitatively similar pattern will be observed in other
applications. E.g. related to the examples discussed in the introduction, the introduction of a ’fat
tax’ will induce a substitution away from fatty foods, and effective water conservation policies will
require substantial adjustment in water consumption and habits.
This section evaluates the transition paths of consumption, prices and habits towards their re-
spective steady states. In Section 5.1, I provide a general characterization of the paths of con-
sumption, prices and habits as the economy converges to the steady state. In Section 5.2, I use
this characterization to evaluate changes in consumption in response to a permanent change in
unit production costs. Section 6.2 evaluates the optimal path, and solves for the policy required to
implement it.
5.1 General characterization
To approximate the path of consumption and prices I loglinearize the system around its steady state.
Let a tilde denote a log-deviation from the steady-state, such that z˜(t)⌘ dz(t)/z⇤ ⇡ (z(t)  z⇤)/z⇤
and thus z˜Ri = z˜i  z˜b for some variable z. The loglinearized the demand equation (7) then reads
13
c˜Ri (t) = h p˜Ri (t)+q h˜Ri (t). (20)
From (5), h˜Ri (t) evolves according to
˙˜hRi (t) = xl h˜Ri (t) , (21)
where I define the following linear relationship between c˜Ri (t) and h˜
R
i (t):
13
l ⌘ 1  c˜Ri (t)/h˜Ri (t). (22)
Then (20)-(22) give the following solutions for the evolution of relative consumption, prices and
habits:
c˜Ri (t) = [1 l ] h˜Ri (t); (23)
p˜R(t) =

q  1+l
h
 
h˜Ri (t); (24)
h˜Ri (t) = h˜
R
i (0)e
 xl t . (25)
From (6) I then solve for the evolution of good-specific consumption:
c˜i(t) = c˜Ri (t) 
R 1
0 dicR⇤i c˜Ri (t)diR 1
0 dicR⇤i di
(26)
The variable h˜Ri (0) represents the initial deviation of relative habits from the steady state. When-
ever this ratio of good i to b habits lies above the steady-state ratio, h˜Ri (0) > 0, while h˜
R
i (0) < 0
if the opposite applies.14 Then for a given value of h˜Ri (0), the paths of consumption and prices
are fully determined by the familiar parameters q , h and x , and l , the convergence factor. This
convergence factor can be interpreted in two ways. First, l , multiplied by the habit adjustment
speed x , is the rate at which habits converge to the new steady state. The larger l , the more rapid
convergence. Second, l determines the choice of consumption ci for a given level of our state vari-
able, the (relative) habit. The larger the convergence factor l , the closer good i consumption will
13For ease of exposition, I implictly assume l is constant and strictly positive. In Sections 5.2 and 6.2 I use
loglinearized pricing rules to determine l and find that l is indeed constant and positive.
14Note that h˜Ri (0) = 0 does not neccesarily imply all hi are in steady state. For instance, suppose that we start in
a steady state, and all goods i are hit by the same proportional shock to di. This affects the steady-state levels of the
ci. Steady-state relative consumption and habits however are unaffected (see (15) and (16)). Hence, h˜R(0) = 0 and
consumption ci will immediately jump to the new steady state, while habits hi slowly adjust.
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be to its steady state for a given steady-state deviation of habits. Of course, the two interpretations
are interrelated. Current consumption affects future habits, which in turn adjust more rapidly the
further is consumption from the habit. Hence, one should expect convergence to be fast if cRi is
close to the steady state for a given hRi . Both the former, fast convergence, and the latter, c˜
R
i close
to zero, are indeed the case if l is high. In the next two sections, I solve for the convergence factor
under perfect competition and monopolistic supply respectively.15
5.2 Transition under constant taxes
To determine the transition path under constant taxes, I use the general solution for the out-of-
steady-state behavior of consumption, prices and habits as presented in the previous subsection.
In this solution, the convergence factor l was left undetermined. In this subsection, I solve for
this convergence factor under perfect competition and monopolistic supply. To maximize profits,
monopolists choose a time-varying markup on marginal cost. From (10), this markup depends not
only on the elasticity of substitution across goods, but also on good-specific consumption, habits
and future price changes. As a consequence, prices set by monopolists and perfectly competitive
firms diverge, and so will consumption choices under these alternative market structures. For now,
I assume taxes are constant and exogenous. Section 6.2 assesses the first-best transition path, and
determines the good-specific taxes and that implement this path. For ease of exposition I explain
results in the context of a sudden and permanent increase in relative unit production cost dRi tRi .
Starting in a steady-state, such a shock triggers a transition of consumption from good i to the base
good b. In line with the examples discussed before, this good i may represent an energy-intensive
good, or unhealthy food.
5.2.1 Perfect competition
Under perfect competition, prices adjust one-for-one with marginal costs (see (9)), which gives
p˜Ri = t˜Ri . (27)
With constant taxes t˜Ri = ˙˜tRi = 0. This implies p˜Ri = 0 at all times. From (24) I can thus determine
the value for the convergence term l pc:
Lemma 1 l pc = 1 q
Proof In text.
15The paper focuses on gradual transitions, e.g. in response to a shock to production costs. Equation (23) can
however also be interpreted in the context of a consumption or production quota. If the quota is binding, consumption
immediately jumps to the steady state: c˜Ri (t) = 0 for all t. This gives l = l qt = 1.
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Then, from (23) and (25), I can conclude the following regarding the path of (relative) con-
sumption and habits. An increase in relative marginal cost for good i causes good i consumption
to fall relative to good b. In response to the drop in cRi , the relative habit falls. This induces a
further decrease in relative consumption until the economy has converged to its new steady state.
The transition to the steady state will be faster the faster is habit adjustment, i.e. higher is x . Also,
a low habit persistence (low q ) implies that both the initial drop in consumption is larger, and the
economy transitions more rapidly to the new steady state.
5.2.2 Monopolists
Under monopolistic supply, the current price is a complex function of future consumption, prices
and habits. The linearization of the monopolist’s pricing rule as expressed by (10) and (11) around
the post-tax steady state gives16
p˜Ri = t˜Ri  
xq
r (h 1)+x (h 1+q)
⇥
c˜Ri   h˜Ri
⇤
+
h 1
r (h 1)+x (h 1+q) ˙˜p
R
i  
1
r+x
˙˜tRi . (28)
Then for t˜Ri = ˙˜tRi = 0, the following can be established regarding lmc:17
Lemma 2 If q > 0, then lmc 2
⇣
l pc, 1+q (h 1) 1
⌘
. If q = 0, then lmc = 1.
Proof See Appendix A.2.1
Lemma 2a If q > 0, then dlmcdr < 0,
dlmc
dx > 0, and
dlmc
dh < 0. For any q ,
dlmc
dq > 0 iff h   1 <
(1 2q)x/(r+x ). Finally, lmc > 1 iff q > 0 and h 1< (1 q)x/(r+x ).
Proof See Appendix A.2.2
Whenever habits cause persistence at the level of specific goods (q > 0) convergence is faster
if goods are produced by monopolists instead of perfectly competitive firms. This is due to the fact
that it is optimal for producers to increase relative prices in excess of the marginal cost increase.
When the marginal cost shock hits, the producer of a i-good realizes that future demand for i
falls below the current habit. This reduces the return to investment in the habit. In response,
the producer increases the markup, and thus increase prices by more than the increase in unit
production costs. For a good-b producer, the exact opposite story holds: it anticipates an increase
in (relative) demand, which increases the return to investment in the habit. A good-b producer thus
chooses a lower markup than its good-i competitor. As consumption converges to the new steady
state, the relative price will fall toward the long run relative price, which is equal to the ratio of
marginal costs.
16Detailed derivations can again be found in Appendix A.1.
17The closed-form solution for lmc can be found in Appendix A.3.1.
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As initially, relative prices increase by more than the increase in relative marginal costs, the
drop in relative consumption under monopolistic supply is greater than the one under perfect com-
petition. In fact, the shift in prices may be so large that cRi undershoots the long run equilibrium.
One can show this is the case if q > 0 and h 1< (1 q)x/(r+x ). This latter condition is more
likely satisfied if goods are weak substitutes (h is low), habits are weak yet change rapidly (low q
and high x ) and time preference is weak (low r). The intuition is subtle, and relates to the sensi-
tivity of prices to good-specific habits, compared to the sensitivity of consumption to these habits,
taking prices as given. Suppose that habits are above the steady state. Then from (11), this causes
a large drop in the shadow value of the habit, khi , if habits affect future demand rapidly (high x ),
future returns are discounted little (low r), the elasticity of demand, h , is low and demand is sen-
sitive to the habit (high q ). This drop in khi increases the monopolist’s price pi, which reduces ci.
The high q however also implies consumption responds strongly to the above steady-state habit.
This outweighs the effect of q through prices; with a high q , cRi is less likely to undershoot the long
run equilibrium if h˜Ri (0) > 0. More generally, and consistent with the intuition above, whenever
q > 0, lmc is increasing in x , and decreasing in r and h . The effect of a change in q on lmc is
ambiguous and depends on parameter values.18
6 Optimal consumption and implementation
A change in relative prices always induces the consumer to reconsider its consumption choices and,
over time, shift to a new consumption bundle. The consumer however is not perfectly rational. She
is subject to projection bias and thereby does not internalize the effect of current consumption
on future preferences through habit formation. Consumption choices are thus likely suboptimal;
from a welfare perspective, the consumer may adjust her consumption choices too slowly, or too
rapidly. In this section, I determine optimal consumption and prices, both in the steady state and
along the transition towards the steady state. Optimal consumption choices are defined as the paths
of consumption, [ci(n)]n=•i2[0,1],n=t , that maximize the present value of instantaneous utilities (1),
subject to (2)-(4), taking into account the endogenous formation of habits (5), and labor market
equilibrium (6). I then assess how policy can be used to implement this first-best consumption
allocation. More specifically, I solve for the (path of) good i taxes or subsidies that induce op-
18Lemmas 2 and 2a can be considered a generalization of a result presented in Ravn et al. (2010). This result states
that monopolistic producers may increase markups following a temporary positive marginal cost shock. An increase
is more likely the more persistent the shock, and for the limiting case where the shock is fully persistent, producers
always increase markups. Ravn et al. (2010) arrive at this result in a discrete-time framework where hit = cit 1. Lemma
2 generalizes this result to a continuous time setup with slow habit adjustment and a permanent shock. Lemma 2a then
points at the novel result that consumption may undershoot its long-run equilibrium.
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timal consumption choices.19 As established in the previous section, the transition path without
intervention depends on the underlying market structure. In line with this result, the tax path that
implements optimal consumption choices under perfect competition differs from the one when
goods are produced by monopolists.
As the previous section, this section abstracts from the source of the increase in relative pro-
duction cost dRi tRi , which sets in motion a transition to a new steady state. In Appendix B I extend
the model to account for the presence of a (positive or negative) externality due to the production
or consumption of one or multiple goods (e.g. an environmental externality). In this case the
correction of such an externality affects the production costs of a subset of firms. I show that all
results concerning the model dynamics carry through.20
The welfare function reads
W (t) =
Z •
t
e r(n t)U(n)dn , (29)
and is maximized subject to (1)-(6). I solve the Hamiltonian and use consumer demand (7) to
arrive at the following rule for optimal prices:21
pi(t) = diµˇL(t) x µˇhi(t), (30)
with
µˇhi (t) =
Z •
t
e (rˇ+x )(n t)
ci (n)
hi (n)
pi (n)
"
q
h 1  

g+ q
h 1
 ✓
hi (n)
H (n)
◆h 1
h
✓
ci (n)
C (n)
◆ h 1h #
dn ,
(31)
where µL is the shadow value of labor and µhi the shadow value of the habit to the consumer in
terms ofC, and rˇ= r 
h
d
dt
⇣
dU(t)
dC(t)
⌘
/dU(t)dC(t)
i
. The optimal price for ci equals its marginal production
cost, minus the marginal value of ci due to habit formation. This value is equal to the direct effect
of an increase in ci on the future habit, x , multiplied by the shadow value of the habit, µˇhi . The
shadow value of the habit captures the effect of an increase in hi on future welfare and can be
19I focus on the use of taxes and subsidies to implement the first-best allocation. As the model features no un-
certainty, any allocation implemented by a given path of taxes/subsidies can also be implemented by (time-varying)
quota. Referring to Dalton and Ghosal (2011), this implies I take an (in)direct paternalistic approach to policy inter-
vention where I implicitly assume the policymaker has full information regarding preferences and their evolution over
time. I thus do not consider a soft-libertarian approach, where policy would take the form of teaching the consumer to
internalize the endogenous habit formation process herself.
20More specifically, any optimal policy intervention can be decomposed into two elements: 1) state-independent
(Pigovian) taxes that correct for the production externality. 2) state-dependent taxes that manage the rate at which
consumption substitutes away from ci, as discussed in the main part of this paper. See Appendix B for more details.
21See Appendix A.1 for detailed derivations.
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separated into two components. First, for q > 0, an increase in the good-specific habit increases
the consumption weight wi, which increases the benefit from ci. Simultaneously however, through
H, an increase in hi reduces the weight of all other goods. The net effect is positive only if ci/C
is large compared to hi/H. Then, an increase in the consumption weight of good i positively
affects aggregate consumption C. Put differently, an increase in hi has positive value if it brings
the ’pattern’ of habits (hi/H) more in line with the ’pattern’ of consumption (ci/C).
The second component is captures the welfare effect of the aggregate habit benchmark and is
negative whenever g > 0. Any increase in the good-specific habit hi increases the aggregate habit
H. This rise in the consumption benchmark in turn reduces utility for a given level of effective
consumptionC.
6.1 Steady state
In steady state, consumption equals habits, both at the good-specific and the aggregate level. This
in turn implies prices are constant. From (31), the steady-state shadow value of the habit is
µˇ⇤hi = g
1
r+x
p⇤i , (32)
which, with (30), gives the following solution for the optimal steady state good i price:
p⇤i = diµˇ⇤L

r+x
r+x (1  g)
 
. (33)
Whenever g > 0, the shadow value of the habit is negative in steady state. Whereas good-specific
persistence is not associated with any steady-state welfare effects, the aggregate habit causes a
negative long-run effect on utility which the consumer does not internalize. The larger is g , the
greater is this negative externality on the future self (i.e. negative internality), which translates
into a higher steady-state markup. More rapid adjustment of consumption to the habit implies the
externality occurs sooner. Like a lower time preference, this increases the present value of the
internality and thereby the optimal steady-state markup.
I can then establish the following:
Proposition 1 In steady state, laissez-faire consumption choices are optimal. Any uniform tax
implements this optimum.
Proof By (33), the optimal relative price in steady state satisfies pR⇤i = dRi . This is equal to (16)
with tR⇤i = 1. Under laissez faire, ti = 1 for all i, so tR⇤i = 1.
As habits and market power affect demand and supply of all goods to an equal extent, they do
not distort the steady-state allocation of consumption across goods. Hence, habits do not provide
19
a rationale for taxing or subsidizing one good more aggressively than another in the long run. As
pointed out before, in the absence of savings and with inelastic labor supply, consumption decisions
are fully determined by relative prices. As a consequence, any tax that is uniform across goods,
including zero taxes, implements this first-best allocation.22
As will be demonstrated in the next subsection, this result only holds in the steady state. Along
the transition towards the steady state, taxes and subsidies may be required to implement optimal
consumption choices.
6.2 Transition
To determine the optimal path of consumption, prices and habits as consumption transitions away
from good i, I adopt the same approach as in Section 5.2, where I solved for the convergence factor
l under perfect competition and monopolistic supply. With (23) and (24), this convergence factor
pins down the paths of consumption and prices outside the steady state. To find the l for the
optimal path, l opt , I first linearize (30) and (31) to find
p˜Ri = 
1
h
x (q   g)
r+x (1  g)
⇥
c˜Ri   h˜Ri
⇤
+
1
r+x (1  g) ˙˜p
R
i . (34)
I can then establish the following regarding l opt :23
Lemma 3 If g 6= q , then l opt 2 (min{1  g, l pc} ,max{1  g, l pc}) while if g = q , then l opt =
l pc = 1 q . Next, l opt < lmc if max{g,q}> 0, while l opt = lmc = 1 if g = q = 0.
Proof See Appendix A.2.3
Lemma 3a For any g and q , dl optdg < 0,
dl opt
dq < 0, and
dl opt
dh = 0.
dl opt
dr > 0 and
dl opt
dx < 0 if g > q ,
while dl
opt
dr < 0 and
dl opt
dx > 0 in case g < q , and
dl opt
dr =
dl opt
dx = 0 if g = q .
Proof See Appendix A.2.4
From which follows
Proposition 2 Suppose goods are produced under perfect competition. If g > (<)q , the laissez-
faire transition to the steady state is suboptimally fast (slow). The optimal adjustment path can
then be implemented by introducing a positive and declining subsidy (tax) on good i whenever
22If we would extend the model to include endogenous labor supply such as in Cremer et al. (2010), or allow the
consumer to transfer consumption across time, as in Carroll et al. (2000), price and tax level changes would affect
consumption levels. Now, due to noninternalized habits, the steady-state consumption level is likely inefficient. In
such a case, from (12), (14) and (33), a steady-state habit tax equal to T ⇤ = r+xr+x (1 g) and T
⇤ = 1h
(r+x )(h 1)+xq
r+x (1 g) under
perfect competition and monopolistic supply respectively implements the first-best steady-state consumption (note I
implicitly assume the equilibrium wage is equal to µL). Note that results for consumption, price and tax ratios are
independent of the levels of these variables, and thus independent of assumptions regarding labor supply and savings.
23The closed-form solution for l opt can be found in Appendix A.3.1.
20
h˜Ri (0)> 0 and a positive and declining tax (subsidy) on good i if h˜
R
i (0)< 0. If g = q , the laissez-
faire transition to the steady state is optimal, and any constant subsidy (tax) implements this path.
Proof See Appendix A.2.5
If we take the transition where consumers face a flat price schedule with p˜Ri = p
R⇤
i as a bench-
mark, it is optimal to speed up the transition from good i to b if the good-specific habit parameter
q is larger than the aggregate habit parameter g , whereas the opposite holds if g > q . This result
can be explained as follows. The consumer does not internalize the effect of current consumption
on future habits. These habits however do affect future utility through the consumption weights wi
and the aggregate habit H. Whether a slower or faster shift in consumption from i to b is welfare-
improving then depends on whether a slower or faster shift in habits increases future utility through
wi and H.
Starting with the effect through wi, I find that a faster transition is welfare-improving. This
can be seen as follows. An increase in p˜Ri induces the consumer to shift consumption away from
good i and towards good b. This shift causes a larger increase (smaller drop) in future effective
consumption C the higher is the weight of good b relative to good i. Hence, future effective
consumption C increases if the weight of good b, relative to good i, rises. This can be achieved by
building habit in good b, and divesting habit in i, which is in turn requires consumption to more
rapidly shift away from good i and towards good b. To summarize, building b habit is beneficial if
b consumption is rising, and conversely, a relatively high i habit is costly if good i consumption is
falling. Hence, welfare is increased if consumers more rapidly get rid of this i habit.
Second, good-specific habits negatively affect welfare as throughH, they jointly act as a bench-
mark against which effective consumption is evaluated. The transition offers an opportunity to
manage, i.e. reduce, this benchmark H. It turns out this argues in favor of a slow transition away
from good i consumption. Although not immediate, the result is intuitive. At each point in time,
the consumer chooses i and b consumption such that it maximizes effective consumption C. Fol-
lowing an increase in the relative price for good i, consumption shifts away from this good, as
postponing, or slowing down this shift, would reduce effective consumption C. A slow transition
however also has an advantage, as ’too high’ consumption of the now relatively expensive good
pulls down the reference habit H.24
If q = 0, the consumption weights wi are independent of habits and hence habits do not cause
good-specific consumption persistence. This implies the first effect is absent, and only the second
24As an extreme example, think of the following. Suppose consumption consists of apples and oranges. Then
a strong increase in the price of apples initiates a shift towards oranges in the consumption bundle. Suppose the
consumer is stubborn, and initially sticks to an apple-intensive diet. Since apples are very expensive, the consumer
can afford only a few and is very hungry. The next period, the consumer decides to spend less on apples such that he
can buy many oranges. As the consumer was used to starving in the previous period (H dropped a lot), the increase in
orange consumption and elimination of hunger constitutes a large welfare gain.
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effect, arguing in favor of a slower transition, is relevant. Similarly, if g = 0, the benchmarkH does
not affect utility for givenC, and habits only affect future utility through wi. More generally, which
of the two mechanisms dominates depends on whether habits are stronger at the good-specific or at
the aggregate level. This can be evaluated by a simple condition comparing the deep habit strength,
q , to the aggregate habit strength, g , as described in Proposition 2.
Finally l opt , and hence the optimal adjustment rate, falls in q and g . The effect of a change in
r or x depends on whether l opt is larger or smaller than l pc. If l opt > l pc, l opt is decreasing in
r and increasing in x .25 If l opt < l pc effects are opposite, and l opt is independent of h .
To implement a slower (faster) transition, the relative price the consumer faces should be below
(above) the long run pRi . Let t˜
R,l
i (t) be the value of t˜Ri (t) required to implement a given l . Then
using (24) and (27), I find that under perfect competition:
t˜R,li (t) =
q  1+l
h
h˜Ri (t). (35)
As described in Section 5.2, along the transition, strategic behavior by the monopolist increases
the relative price pRi in excess of the increase in relative marginal costs. As a consequence, com-
pared to the benchmark with pRi = p
R⇤
i , the shift in consumption from good i to b is already faster
to begin with. One would thus expect that a subsidy on i, which slows down the transition, is more
likely required to implement the optimal transition in the presence of market power. This is indeed
the case:
Proposition 3 Suppose goods are produced by monopolists. If max{g,q} > 0, the laissez-faire
transition to the steady state is suboptimally fast. The optimal adjustment path can then be im-
plemented by introducing a positive and declining subsidy on good i whenever h˜Ri (0) > 0 and a
positive and declining tax on good i if h˜Ri (0) < 0. If g = q = 0, the laissez-faire transition to the
steady state is optimal, and any constant subsidy (tax) implements this path.
Proof See Appendix A.2.6
With habit formation (i.e. either g or q > 0), the monopolist always implements a transition that
is too rapid from a welfare perspective. First, the monopolist does not take into account the bene-
fits of a slow transition in bringing down the aggregate habit H. Yet even if g = 0, i.e. even if the
benchmark habit plays no role in determining utility from consumption C, a welfare-maximizing
policy slows down the shift in consumption from i to b implemented by the monopolist. This is
because of the following. We know that along the transition, there is a benefit to quickly ’rebal-
ancing’ the consumption weights wi such that they become more in line with actual consumption.
The monopolist recognizes this too; as demand for good i falls over time, investing in the habit
25The rate at which consumption and habits adjust to the new steady state, xl opt , is always increasing in x . See
Appendix A.3.2 for a proof.
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becomes less valuable. As a response, the monopolist increases its markup to quickly divest habit
and thus reduce the consumption weight. The monopolist however, does not take into account
that this increases the consumption weight of all other goods, leading to a rapid rebalancing of the
wi. From a welfare-perspective, this rebalancing is too rapid. Hence, (partially) countering the
monopolist’s response to increase prices when habits are ’too high’ increases welfare.
I can again solve for t˜R,li (t), now under monopolistic supply. Equations (24) and (28) give
t˜R,li (t) =
1
h
24(q  1)
h
(r+x )+x qh 1
i
+l (r+xl )
(r+x )+x qh 1
35 r+x
r+x (1+l )
h˜Ri (t), (36)
where by definition, the bracketed term is zero for l = lmc, and negative for l < lmc.
7 Application
To illustrate the adjustment path of consumption and assess the potential quantitative implications
of habit formation I evaluate the effects of an unanticipated 10 percent increase in the production
cost of a subset of goods. Though insights apply more generally, for the sake of exposition, I inter-
pret this cost shock in the context of food taxes, where the subset of goods are ’unhealthy foods’,
and the cost increase may resemble the introduction of a 10 percent charge on the saturated fat and
sugars.26,27 This charge may be fully passed through to consumers, or producers may act strate-
gically and adjust markups in response to the levy. In either case, due to habits in consumption,
demand for fatty and sugary foods will not instantly jump to the new steady state with a lower
consumption of unhealthy foods. I compute the paths of consumption and prices as the economy
converges to its new steady state. I compare the paths under perfect competition and monopolis-
tic supply to the first-best consumption path. Temporary subsidies will be required to implement
the optimal consumption path. These subsidies can be interpreted as temporary discounts on the
permanent charge, or simply a slow phase-in of the charge. Finally, I compute the welfare gain of
implementing an optimal path instead of the alternative adjustment paths.
To obtain numerical results I discretize the model. Further details about the discrete-time model
setup can be found in Appendix C.
26Thus, I do not aim to perform a detailed policy simulation such as Allais et al. (2010). Given the stylized nature
of the framework, the results should be primarily viewed as an indication of the quantitative significance of the habit
internality
27[order of magnitude ref] To ensure a clear distinction between the ’habit’ tax (or subsidy) and the ’fat and sugar’
tax, I will refer to the latter as a charge.
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7.1 Parameter choices
The parameter values are determined as follows. Across the US and Europe, spending on food
and nonalcoholic beverages accounts for about 12 percent of household spending (Eurostat, 2016;
BLS, 2017). Of this 12 percent, about a third can be classified as ’unhealthy’ (Mytton et al., 2007).
Based on this, I set n, which I define as the share of goods subject to the charge, equal to 0.04. I
separate the gross tax ti into two parts, the constant charge tiC, and the (potentially) time-varying
’habit tax’ tiH , such that ti = tiCtiH . Initial tiC and tiH are equal to 1 for all goods. Then, as of
time t = 0, unhealthy food will be subject to an additional charge, such that for producers of goods
i 2 [0,n], tiC increases to 1.1.
In the framework, the elasticity of substitution directly determines the short run price elasticity
of demand (see (7)). Empirical estimates for the latter for specific consumer goods, including
food categories, typically deliver low values, often below 1, suggesting complementarity (see for
instance Andreyeva et al., 2010; Zhen et al., 2011; Green et al., 2013). Macro-level calibrations
require values above 4 to match observed markups (Ravn et al 2006; 2010). For the main part
of the numerical exercise I take a middle ground and set h = 2; I perform sensitivity analysis for
h = 0.4 and h = 1.2.28
The habit parameters q and g are major determinants of the rate at which consumption transi-
tions take place, and the policy required to maximize welfare along a transition. Several approaches
can be used to infer the appropriate values for these parameters.
For q , I consider empirical research on good-specific consumption persistence, and research
that estimates both the short- and long run price elasticities of demand. Under the former approach,
estimates for q range from zero to 0.72, with a central value of about 0.3 (Carrasco et al., 2005;
Zhen et al., 2011; Bronnenberg et al., 2012; Verhelst and Van den Poel, 2014). With the exception
of Bronnenberg et al. (2012), these estimates use (a measure of) previous month or quarter con-
sumption expenditure as a benchmark. The appropriate benchmark is however not immediate, and
if habits are persistent, these estimates may either under- or over-estimate the ’real’ q . Bronnen-
berg et al. (2012) instead use geographic variation in brand preferences to elicit the causal effect of
past experiences on future preferences. They find that 60 percent of the gap in brand preferences
can be attributed to supply-side factors, while endogenous and persistent brand preferences explain
40 percent of the geographic variation in brand market shares. One can show this corresponds to
q = 0.4.29
An alternative estimation procedure for q does not face the ’benchmarking’ problem either.
This approach is based on short- and long-run price elasticities of demand. From Section 4.1, I
28Since the analysis for the monopolist requires h > 1, I will only explore the perfect competition and first-best
equilibria for h = 0.4.
29Details available on request.
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know these are equal to eSRp = h and eLRp = h/(1 q) respectively. Then q = 1 eSRp /eLRp . Espey
et al. (1997) conduct a meta analysis of price elasticities for residential water consumption. Based
on their median estimates for short and long run elasticities, I find a q equal to 0.41. Scott (2015)
presents an overview of estimates of the elasticity of gasoline demand. The central value for q
based on these estimates is 0.6. Baltagi et al. (2000) estimate cigarette demand and also arrive
at a value of 0.6.30 Demand persistence for gasoline and cigarettes however likely overestimates
the persistence of a ’representative’ good: cigarettes are highly addictive and short-run gasoline
demand is to a large extent determined by the vehicle a consumer owns. For this reason, I consider
the estimate of 0.6 to be an upper bound for the appropriate q and set q = 0.4. I perform sensitivity
analysis for q = 0.2 and q = 0.6,
For g , I consider estimates based on empirical evidence related to the Easterlin paradox and
hedonic adaptation, aggregate consumption persistence and calibrations. High values for g (close
to 1) are required to explain the Easterlin paradox (Easterlin, 1974; Easterlin et al., 2010). Although
evidence for happiness, or hedonic, adaptation is robust, the strong form of the Easterlin paradox,
where long-run happiness is unaffected income changes, is heavily contested (Clark, 1999; Oswald
and Powdthavee, 2008; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008; Easterlin et al., 2010). With incomplete
adaptation, the value of g is not easily determined, as reported happiness scores cannot be directly
translated to utility units.
In my framework, to focus on consumption shifts across sectors, I abstract from saving and
capital accumulation. If intertemporal consumption tradeoffs are take into account, the aggregate
habit parameter g plays an additional role in determining the degree of aggregate consumption
persistence.31 Empirically estimating this persistence, Ravina (2005) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al.
(2012) find that a 1 percent increase in past aggregate consumption increases current consumption
by 0.3 to 0.5 percent.32 The corresponding estimate for g then depends on the s chosen. For
s = 2, g lies in between 0.6 and 1, and higher g are found for lower s .33
Finally, I turn to calibrations. In a model that allows for saving, Abel (1990) requires values for
g close to 1 to explain the equity premium puzzle. Fuhrer (2000) introduces habits in a monetary
policy model and estimates g to fit the data. He arrives at a value of 0.8 to 0.9. Overall, evidence
seems to suggest higher values for g than q . I follow Fuhrer (2000), and set g = 0.8, and perform
30Baltagi et al. (2000) compare a large number of models. I use the estimate of the model they consider best-
performing.
31See for instance Carroll et al. (2000), Fuhrer (2000), Diaz et al. (2003) and Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004). See
also footnote 22.
32Dynan (2000) and Guariglia and Rossi (2002) estimate consumption persistence based on aggregate food con-
sumption. As food is still a broad aggregate, I cannot readily reinterpret their estimates as estimates of q or g . They
both find no or negative consumption persistence. However, their estimates, as well as those by Ravina (2005) and
Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2012), suffer from the same ’benchmarking’ problem discussed before.
33For s = 1, aggregate consumption demand is independent of the habit. For s < 1, g < 0 is required to generate
aggregate persistence.
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sensitivity analysis for g = 0.4 and g = 0.6.
Less empirical guidance exists regarding the speed of habit adjustment, x . Ravn et al. (2012)
and Bronnenberg et al. (2012) find habits to adjust very slowly over time; on an annual basis x
is equal to 0.05 and 0.025 respectively. This slow adjustment is in line with Logan and Rhode
(2010) and Atkin (2013), who find that prices (more than) 10 years in the past can partly explain
current patterns of food consumption. Carroll et al. (2000) adopt an annual value of 0.2 while
Constantinides (1990) requires values as high as 0.6 to explain the equity premium puzzle. Finally,
much of the literature takes habits as equal to past-year consumption. I take a 50 percent annual
adjustment. As I estimate the model on a monthly basis (dt = 1 month), this gives x = 0.06. In
the sensitivity analysis I consider x = 0.03 and x = 0.12. Finally, I set the monthly discount rate
r = 0.0035,34 the elasticity of marginal utility s = 1.5, unit labor requirement di = 1 for all i, and
total labor supply L = 1. With initial marginal production cost di equal to 1 for all i, this gives
initial steady state consumption, habits and prices equal to 1 for all goods. An overview of all
baseline parameter values can be found in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Baseline values Description
n 0.04 Share of goods subject to the charge
di 1 Unit labor requirement
h 2 Elasticity of substitution
q 0.4 Deep habit strength
g 0.8 Aggregate habit strength
x 0.06 Habit adjustment speed (monthly)
r 0.0035 Rate of time preference (monthly)
s 1.5 Elasticity of marginal utility
L 1 Labor supply
7.2 Results
Figure 1 shows the response of unhealthy food consumption and prices relative to ’non-unhealthy
food’ consumption following the introduction of the permanent charge on saturated fats and sugar
at time 0. The dashed and dotted curves depict the response when goods are produced competi-
tively or by monopolists respectively, without any additional policy intervention. The solid curves
depict the optimal paths.
Under perfect competition, consumers face a one-off increase in prices (see Figure 1b). In
response to this price increase, consumers instantly reduce relative consumption by 17 percent.35
34This corresponds to an annual discount rate of about 4 percent.
35Figure 1a depicts relative consumption paths. As the price change only affects 4 percent of goods, demand for
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An additional 10 percent reduction is achieved as habits fall over time and consumption follows
this drop in habit. As expected, the shift away from unhealthy foods is faster under monopolists:
at t = 0 consumption immediately drops by 24 percent. Following this drop, also habits quickly
adjust. The rapid consumption response is the consequence of strategic behavior; monopolists
increase prices for unhealthy foods relative to other goods by an additional 5 percent (see Figure
1b).
Along the transition to the new steady state, neither of the two paths described above are op-
timal. From Proposition 3 we know that the monopolist always implements a transition that is
suboptimally fast. For our parameter values we have g > q . Proposition 2 then informs us that
also under perfect competition, the shift away from unhealthy food consumption under perfect
competition is faster than optimal. Figure 1a confirms this: cRi is higher along the optimal path
(solid curve) than along the paths where the transition is not specifically managed (dashed and
dotted curves). In the optimum, time 0 unhealthy food consumption falls by only 11 percent. Con-
sumption continues to drop afterwards, yet it takes more than 10 years until the full transition is
accomplished. To ensure consumers select these first-best consumption levels, the relative price
for unhealthy food should increase by only 5.9 percent initially, and then slowly rise to its long run
level of 1.1.
Figure 1: Transition away from unhealthy food consumption
(a) (b)
The curves depict responses to the unanticipated introduction of the 10 percent charge at t = 0, where I assume the
economy is in steady state for all t < 0. Responses are shown for a good i 2 [0,n] relative to any good b 2 (n,1].
To implement the a price path according to the solid line in Figure 1b we require a temporary
all other goods increases by less than 1 percent at any point during the transition. The difference between changes
in absolute unhealthy food consumption, and consumption of unhealthy food relative to non-unhealthy food goods is
thus small, and I use the two concepts interchangeably.
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subsidy to unhealthy food (i.e. discount to the food charge). Under perfect competition, this would
amount to a subsidy of about 3.4 percent (gross tax of 0.966, see Figure 2). This is about a third
of the total 10 percent charge. A larger transitory subsidy is required if goods are produced by
monopolists, who initially increase prices in excess of the charge. Now, an initial subsidy of 5.6
percent, which falls to 4.6 percent after 1 year and 1.6 percent after 5 years implements the optimal
adjustment path.
Figure 2
The curves depict the path of taxes required to implement the first-best adjustment path, in response to the unantici-
pated introduction of the 10 percent charge at t = 0, where I assume the economy is in steady state for all t < 0. Taxes
are shown for a good i 2 [0,n] relative to any good b 2 (n,1].
The above-mentioned subsidies have a large impact on prices and consumption choices as the
economy reduces its unhealthy food consumption. This raises the question of whether this policy
also generates sizable welfare gains. For this purpose, I compute the consumption-equivalent
welfare loss due to the transition.36 Here I take into account that the charge may be implemented
as a welfare-improving policy to begin with, and may thus not only set in motion a transition to
a new steady state, but also move the economy away from a distorted steady state.37 To separate
these two effects, I compute two losses, one which solely captures the loss due to the transition, and
one which, in addition, captures the benefit from correcting a previously uncorrected externality.
Results are presented in Table 2.38
From Figure 1a I know that consumption adjustment is relatively slow along the optimal path,
and fast under monopolistic supply. Hence, I expect welfare to be highest (losses to be lowest) in
36More formally, let WX (CX ) be welfare under consumption path X and W ⇤ (C⇤) welfare if the economy is in
steady-state. Then the (steady-state) consumption-equivalent welfare loss is bX , with bX implicitly determined by
WX (CX ) =W ⇤ ((1 bX )C⇤).
37This can for instance be motivated by the existence of publicly-paid healthcare systems, which cause consumers
to not carry the full burden of dietary choices.
38See Appendix C.1 for more details.
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the first-best transition, followed by the transition under perfect competition and monopolists. This
is confirmed by Table 2. Table 2 reports the consumption-equivalent welfare loss of the transition
for four cases; the three cases considered in the paper, and the case where all ci are set to their
respective steady-state immediately (’no transition’, bottom row).39 Reported losses are small,
about 0.008%; as the 10% long-run price shock only affects a share n = 0.04 of goods this is not
surprising. Optimally managing the transition reduces welfare losses by 0.0056% to 0.0012%; this
is 1.4%-6.9% of the loss under first-best. This reduction in welfare losses is very similar when I
take into account benefits from correcting for the production externality.
Table 2: Consumption-equivalent loss of transition
Case Loss excluding
’externality benefit’
Loss including
’externality benefit’
First-best 0.0811% -0.0067%
Perfect competition 0.0823% -0.0055%
Monopolists 0.0851% -0.0027%
No transition 0.0867% -0.0014%
Rule of thumb policy Even though the first-best adjustment path minimizes welfare losses, the
other two paths have a clear advantage in terms of implementation. Under the perfect competition
and monopolists path, policy takes the form of a one-off increase in the ’unhealthy-food’ charge,
absent any further intervention. Of these two paths, the perfect competition path, where consumers
face a flat price schedule, performs best. In this paragraph, I consider two ’rule of thumb’ poli-
cies which aim to reduce welfare losses compared to this perfect competition path, yet are more
straightforward to implement than the optimal path. The first rule of thumb policy targets con-
sumption; it is a ’unhealthy food’ quota, that is lowered each year. In the first year, it imposes a
11 percent drop in cRi . Then, each year, for four consecutive years, the c
R
i is lowered by an equal
amount, such that after 4 years, it reaches its steady state.40 The second rule of thumb policy tar-
gets prices. It sets a relative price of ’unhealthy food’ equal to 1.06 in the first year, and increases
this price by 0.01 point each year for four years thereafter. Figure 3 presents the paths of cRi and
pRi under both rules of thumb, and in the first-best transition. As is clear from Figure 3a, both
rules implement a shift that is somewhat slower than first-best initially, yet reaches the steady state
sooner. Under the consumption rule, (implicit) prices overshoot the long run equilibrium for a
39Note that even though consumption immediately jumps to its long run level, habits still require time to adjust.
40The 4 year period is chosen as follows. For the parameter values in Table 1, l opt = 0.3656 (see Appendix A.3.1).
The adjustment speed, x ⇤l is then about 2.2 percent a month. A rough approximation of the total adjustment period
in turn gives 1/0.022 = 45.5 months⇡4 years. The 11 percent initial drop in cRi is set close to the initial drop in the
optimal path (10.87%). The approach to determine the rule of thumb price path is equivalent, with the initial 6% price
increase set close to the initial increase in first-best (5.92%).
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substantial period of time. The simple policy rules do not always improve upon the allocation with
the flat price schedule (Table 2, second column). Under the consumption rule, the consumption-
equivalent loss of the transition is 0.0824%, i.e. it performs better than the monopolist (and no
transition) path, but is just shy of beating the perfect competition case. The price rule performs
better, here I find a loss of 0.0818%.41
Figure 3: Transition under rules of thumb
(a) (b)
Curves depict policy rules where policy is introduced at t = 0. I assume the economy is in steady state for all t < 0.
Paths are shown for a good i 2 [0,n] relative to any good b 2 (n,1].
Sensitivity Results for alternative parameter values are presented in Figures D.1-D.3 in Ap-
pendix D. The effects of a change in the value of a particular parameter are fully in line with the
results presented in Sections 4-6 and Lemmas 1-3. A lower short run price elasticity of demand, h ,
reduces the short- and long-run consumption responses in response to the charge. Interestingly, for
h = 1.2, consumption undershoots its long run equilibrium if goods are produced by monopolists.
This is in line with Lemma 2a, which states that lmc> 1 if q > 0 and h 1< (1 q)x/(r+x ).42
The long run price elasticity is also determined by q , with higher values for q implying larger
long-run consumption adjustment in response to the charge. A lower q (good-specific demand
less dependent of habits) and higher x (faster habit adjustment) clearly increase the rate at which
the economy transitions to the steady-state. Proposition 3 stated that in the log-linearized model,
the perfection competition transition equals first-best when g = q . I consider this case when I set
41When I take into account the benefit from correcting the externality, as in the rightmost column of Table 2, I find
values of -0.0060% and -0.0066% respectively. Now, the consumption rule does improve welfare compared to the
perfect competition path.
42For the parameter values in Table 1, (1 q)x/(r+x ) = 0.57. Thus, this condition is satisfied whenever h <
1.57.
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g = 0.4 (Figures D.1-D.3, third row, left column), and find that also here, the approximation is very
accurate; the respective cRi deviate by less than 0.003.
The result that habit formation might call for substantial discounts on the initial charge is not
very sensitive to parameter choices. With the exception of the last case discussed above, implied
short-run discounts on the charge range from 20 to 60 percent. In addition, within the range I
consider, the variation in topti (0) is almost fully driven by variation in the two habit parameters, q
and g .
Accuracy of the linear approximation As a final exercise, I compare the numerical results to the
linear approximation of the consumption path in (23). I find that this approximation is accurate. For
the parameter values in Table 1 we have l pc = 0.6, lmc = 0.91 and l opt = 0.37 and h˜Ri (0) = 0.37.
Then, from (23), time 0 unhealthy-food relative to non-unhealthy-food consumption should equal
0.84, 0.75, and 0.90 under perfect competition, monopolists and the optimal path respectively.
Comparing these values to the results discussed above I find that the approximation is off by at
most 0.01 points. The linear approximation is accurate too regarding the adjustment speed. For the
change in cRi that remains after the initial drop, the approximation predicts a half life of 19, 13 and
32 months for perfect competition, monopolists and the optimal path respectively.43 Comparing
these half-lives to those in Figure 1a reveals a bias of at most one month.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies consumption choices when consumption is subject to good-specific habit for-
mation. I develop a stylized representative-consumer model where I explicitly distinguish between
two roles of habits. First, good-specific habits cause the allocation of consumption across goods to
be persistent; shift within the consumption bundle are slow. Second, these habits jointly determine
the benchmark against which consumption is evaluated; the higher habits, the higher the ‘standard
of living’ the consumer is accustomed to and the lower is welfare for a given level of consump-
tion. I consider the case where the consumer does not internalize the fact that current consumption
affects future habits (projection bias) and characterize the equilibrium consumption choices and
prices when goods are produced under perfect competition or by forward-looking monopolists.
I find that the steady-state allocation of consumption across goods is independent of market
power. As all goods are to an equal extent subject to habit formation, projection bias does not
distort the steady-state consumption allocation. The transition toward the steady state may however
be suboptimal. Whenever goods are produced by monopolists, strategic pricing speeds up shifts
within the consumption bundle, and cause those to be suboptimally fast. In this case, the optimal
43For the approximation, the half life T is computed by solving e xlT = 0.5.
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transition can be implemented by tax that slows down the transition to the steady state. In the
absence of market power, the consumer adjusts its consumption bundle suboptimally fast if the
second, ‘welfare’, role of habits is particularly strong. If instead the persistence effect of habits
dominates, a tax policy that speeds up the transition is preferred.
While the model and its discussion are stylized, its applications are numerous. In the upcoming
decades, some major shifts will likely occur in our consumption patterns. Increased water short-
ages in many regions in the world necessitate consumers to reduce water use. Resource scarcity
and concerns about climate change will call for a reduction in energy use, especially if the cost of
renewable energy remains high, and in many countries, taxes on fatty or sugary foods to induce
consumers to adopt a healthier diet are currently on the table. Such (policy-induced) shifts in our
consumption bundles will not happen from one day to another, with habit formation being one
reason for such slow transitions. In all these instances, a relevant question is whether there is a role
for policy in managing the rate at which such change occurs. For instance, in the context of fat
taxes, it is optimal to force consumers to quickly get rid of unhealthy dietary habits by introducing
hefty initial rates? Or is it perhaps preferred to allow consumers to slowly adjust their demand for
fatty foods, by implementing a tax that starts low and increases over time?
In a numerical exercise I apply the model to answer the latter question. More specifically, I
consider the introduction of a 10 percent charge on a subset of good (’unhealthy food’), which
induces a transition away from these goods. This application reveals that the theoretical effects
are also quantitatively meaningful. I find that the transition under perfect competition and mo-
nopolistic supply is substantially faster than the first-best transition; the first-best path calls for a
lower immediate reductions in ’unhealthy food’ consumption, and allows the remaining reduction
to slowly materialize over time. To implement this path, the policymaker can offers consumers an
initial discount of as much as 60 percent of the long-run charge. The optimal path requires careful
management of consumption and/or prices. I evaluate two rule of thumb policies that are easier
to implement and have the potential to bring welfare closer to first-best compared to the one-off
charge.
In the above examples the shift in the consumption bundle is policy-induced to begin with.
The same questions and insights however apply if the cause of the shift is external. Consider for
example the common call for policy action when gasoline prices increase due to shifts on world
oil markets. Also shifts in food prices, caused by misharvests or increased openness to trade,
are often followed by appeals for government intervention such as (temporary) subsidies or tax
breaks.44 The framework and numerical results in this paper provide support for such measures;
with habit formation and projection bias, a policy that allows people to partly postpone adjustment
44The latter example relates to the work by Atkin (2013), who documents that habits reduce the nutritional gains
from trade in India, as consumers continue to favor foods that were relatively inexpensive in the past.
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in consumption is welfare-improving.
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A Derivations and proofs
A.1 Detailed derivations
A.1.1 Equations (10), (11) and (28)
The good i monopolist maximizes Vi(t) =
R •
t e
 R nt r(x)dxci(n) [pi(n) diti(n)]dn , by choosing the
path of supply, [ci(n)]n=•n=t , taking into account demand, (7), and the process of good-specific habit
formation, (5). The producer takes as given the price index P and aggregate habit H. Hence it
solves the following Hamiltonian:
H = ci [pi di pLti]+kpi
"
c
  1h
i
✓
hi
H
◆ q
h
C
1
h   pi
#
+khi [x (ci hi)] , (A.1)
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where kpi is the shadow value of inverse demand pi and khi is the shadow value of habits hi and I
have already substituted (3) in (2). This gives the following FOC:
[ci] pi di pLti kpi 1h pici +xkhi = 0
[pi] ci kpi = 0
[hi] qh kpi
pi
hi  xkhi = rkhi  k˙hi
(A.2)
Then I substitute kpi = ci (see FOC with respect to pi) in the FOCs for ci and hi. This gives (10)
and (11). Next, I take the time derivative of (10):
k˙hi = 
1
x

h 1
h
p˙i di pLti

p˙L
pL
+
t˙i
ti
  
, (A.3)
which with the FOCs for hi gives
khi =
1
r+x

pi
h 1
h

q
h 1
ci
hi
  1
x
p˙i
pi
 
+
1
x
di pLti

p˙L
pL
+
t˙i
ti
  
. (A.4)
I then substitute this result in (10) to find the following solution for pi:
pi = di pLti
h
h 1
24 1  1r+x
h
p˙L
pL +
t˙i
ti
i
1+ 1h 1
x
r+x q
ci
hi   1r+x
p˙i
pi
35 . (A.5)
This equation is in turn used to obtain the steady-state price, (14), and loglinearized to arrive at
(28).
A.1.2 Equations (30), (31) and (34)
To maximize (29) subject to (1)-(6) by choosing [ci(n)]n=•i2[0,1],n=t I write the following Hamiltonian:
H =
(CH g)1 s
1 s +µC
24"Z 1
0
✓
hi
H
◆ q
h
c
h 1
h
i di
# h
h 1
 C
35+µH "Z 1
0
h
h 1+q
h
i di
  h
h 1+q
 H
#
+µL

L 
Z 1
0
dicidi
 
+µhi [x (ci hi)] , (A.6)
where µC, µH and µL are the shadow values of effective consumption, aggregate habit and labor
respectively, µhi is the shadow value of the good-specific habit, and (2) and (4) have been slightly
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rewritten by substituting in (3). This gives the following FOC:
[C] (CH g)1 s 1C  µC = 0
[H]  g (CH g)1 s 1H  µC qh 1 CH  µH = 0
[ci] µCC
1
h
⇣
hi
H
⌘ q
h c
h 1
h
i
1
ci  diµL+xµhi = 0
[hi] µC qh 1
  ci
C
   1h ⇣hi
H
⌘ q
h ci
hi +µH
⇣
hi
H
⌘  1 qh  xµhi = rµhi  µ˙hi
(A.7)
Next define µˇL ⌘ µL/µC and µˇhi ⌘ µhi/µC, such that ˙ˇµhi = µˇhi
h µ˙hi
µ˙hi
  µ˙Cµ˙C
i
, and rewrite (7) to
pi =
⇣ci
C
⌘  1h ✓hi
H
◆ q
h
. (A.8)
With the FOC for ci this gives (30). Then to arrive at (31), I first substitute µC = (CH g)1 sC 1
in the FOC for H. This gives µH = µC CH
h
g+ qh 1
i
. I then substitute these results for µC and µH
and (A.8) in the FOC for hi to find
µˇhi =
1
rˇ+x
"
˙ˇµhi +
ci
hi
pi
"
q
h 1  

g+ q
h 1
 ✓
hi
H
◆h 1
h ⇣ci
C
⌘ h 1h ## (A.9)
where rˇ = r  µ˙C/µC and which gives (31). Next, I take the time derivative of (30):
˙ˇµhi = 
1
x
⇥
p˙i di ˙ˇµL
⇤
, (A.10)
and substitute this in (A.9) which gives
µˇhi =
1
rˇ+x
"
pi
"
ci
hi
"
q
h 1  

g+ q
h 1
 ✓
hi
H
◆h 1
h ⇣ci
C
⌘ h 1h #  1
x
p˙i
pi
#
+
1
x
di ˙ˇµL
#
. (A.11)
I then substitute this result in (10) to find the following solution for the optimal price:
pi = diµˇL
266664
1  xrˇ+x
˙ˇµL
µˇL
1+ xrˇ+x
ci
hi
"
q
h 1  
h
g+ qh 1
i⇣
hi
H
⌘h 1
h   ci
C
  h 1h #  xrˇ+x p˙ipi
377775 , (A.12)
which can in turn be loglinearized to find (34).
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proof to Lemma 2
First I take the time derivative of the loglinearized consumer demand function (20):
˙˜cRi = h ˙˜pRi +q ˙˜hRi . (A.13)
Next, loglinearizing (5) allows me to write
˙˜hRi = x
⇥
c˜Ri   h˜Ri
⇤
. (A.14)
Then using (20), (A.13) and (A.14) in (28) and observing that under constant taxes, t˜Ri = ˙˜tRi = 0,
I find the following formula for change in c˜Ri as a function of c˜
R
i and h
R
i :
˙˜cRi = (r+x ) c˜Ri  
q
h 1 [(r+x )(h 1)+x (q  1)] h˜
R
i . (A.15)
This gives the following system of dynamic equations:" ˙˜hRi
˙˜cRi
#
=
"
 x x
  qh 1 [(r+x )(h 1)+x (q  1)] r+x
#"
h˜Ri
c˜Ri
#
. (A.16)
From (23) and (25), ˙˜hRi = xl h˜Ri and ˙˜cRi = xl c˜Ri , so
0=
"
 x (1 l ) x
  qh 1 [(r+x )(h 1)+x (q  1)] r+x (1+l )
#"
h˜Ri
c˜Ri
#
. (A.17)
This gives
Rmc (l ) = (q  1)

(r+x )+x q
h 1
 
+l [r+xl ] , (A.18)
with lmc implicitly determined by Rmc (lmc) = 0.
As q < 1, I know Rmc(0) < 0. Then as dRmc/dl > 0 for l > 0 know there exists a solution
l opt > 0. Next Rmc(l pc) = l pcxqh (h 1) 1, which is strictly negative for q > 0 and equal to
zero if q = 0. Hence, I can conclude that if q = 0, lmc = l pc = 1, while if q > 0, lmc > l pc. Then
for l 0 = 1+ qh 1 , R
mc(l 0) = q hh 1
h
(r+x )+x qh 1
i
> 0, so lmc < 1+ qh 1 whenever q > 0.
A.2.2 Proof to Lemma 2a
The effect of a change in the individual parameters on lmc can be determined by taking a to-
tal differential of (A.18) and evaluating it at l = lmc. I first consider the case with q > 0.
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Then dl
mc
dr =   dR
mc/dr
dRmc/dl
   
l=lmc
, with dRmc/dr = (q  1)+l . As has been established in Section
A.2.1, dRmc/dl > 0 and lmc > 1  q , so dlmc/dr < 0. Next, dlmcdx =   dR
mc/dx
dRmc/dl
   
l=lmc
, where
dRmc/dx = (q  1)
⇣
1+ qh 1
⌘
+l 2 which is ambiguous at first sight. Note however that by using
(A.18) one can rewrite dRmc/dx = 1x (R
mc r (dRmc/dr)). At l = lmc, Rmc = 0 and dRmc/dr >
0, so dRmc/dx > 0 and dlmc/dx < 0. Next, dlmcdh =  dR
mc/dh
dRmc/dl
   
l=lmc
, with dRmc/dh =
 (q  1)x q
(h 1)2 > 0, which gives dl
mc/dh < 0. In addition, dlmcdq =   dR
mc/dq
dRmc/dl
   
l=lmc
, with
dRmc/dq = r + xh 1 [h+2(q  1)]. Rewriting this equation reveals that dRmc/dq < 0, and thus
dlmc/dq > 0, iff (h 1) < (1 2q)x/(r+x ). Inspection of dRmc/dq reveals this latter result
continues to apply if q = 0.
Lastly, lmc > 1 if Rmc(1) = (q  1)
h
(r+x )+x qh 1
i
+ [r+x ] < 0. This inequality can be
rewritten as q (h 1)< q (1 q)x/(r+x ).
A.2.3 Proof to Lemma 3
The optimal path of consumption can be found by combining (30), with (20), (A.13) and (A.14):
˙˜cRi = (r+x ) c˜R  [q (r+x )+xg (1 q)] h˜Ri . (A.19)
Then together with the time derivative of (20) I find the following system of dynamic equations" ˙˜hRi
˙˜cRi
#
=
"
 x x
  [q (r+x )+xg (1 q)] r+x
#"
h˜Ri
c˜Ri
#
. (A.20)
From (23) and (25) I have ˙˜hRi = xl h˜Ri and ˙˜cRi = xl c˜Ri , so
0=
"
 x (1 l ) x
  [q (r+x )+xg (1 q)] r+x (1+l )
#"
h˜Ri
c˜Ri
#
. (A.21)
This gives
Ropt (l ) = (q  1) [r+x (1  g)]+l (r+xl ) , (A.22)
with l opt implicitly determined by Ropt (l opt) = 0.
As q < 1, I know Ropt(0) < 0. Then as dRopt/dl > 0 for l > 0, I know there exists a so-
lution l opt > 0. Next, I can show that Ropt(1  g) = (q   g) [r+x (1  g)] while Ropt (l pc) =
(q   g)(q  1)x . Then if g = q , we have l opt = 1  q = l pc. If g < q , we must have l opt 2
(1 q , 1  g) while if g > q , l opt 2 (1  g, 1 q). Finally, Ropt(lmc) =  (q  1)x
h
g+ qh 1
i
which is strictly positive if g and/or q are strictly positive, and equal to zero if g = q = 0. Hence,
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I can conclude that l opt < lmc if max{g,q}> 0, while l opt = lmc = 1 if g = q = 0.
A.2.4 Proof to Lemma 3a
The effect of a change in the individual parameters on l opt can be determined by taking a to-
tal differential of (A.22) and evaluating it at l = l opt . Then dl optdg =   dR
opt/dg
dRopt/dl
   
l=l opt
, with
dRopt/dg = x (1 q)> 0. As has been established in Section A.2.3, dRopt/dl > 0, so dl opt/dg <
0. Next dl
opt
dq =   dR
opt/dq
dRopt/dl
   
l=l opt
, where dRopt/dq = r + x (1  g) > 0 so dl opt/dq < 0. Sim-
ilarly, dl
opt
dr =   dR
opt/dr
dRopt/dl
   
l=l opt
, with dRopt/dr = l   (1 q). Then if g > q , l opt < 1 q and
dl opt/dr > 0, if g < q , l opt > 1  q and dl opt/dr < 0, and if g = q , l opt = 1  q , which
gives dl opt/dr = 0. I know dl optdx =   dR
opt/dx
dRopt/dl
   
l=l opt
, where dRopt/dx = l 2  (1 q)(1  g).
By (A.22), I can rewrite the latter as dRopt/dx = (Ropt r (dRopt/dr))/x . At l = l opt , Ropt is
equal to zero, which implies dl opt/dx is of opposite sign as dl opt/dr . Finally, as h does not
appear in (A.22), dl opt/dh = 0.
A.2.5 Proof to Proposition 2
First, the optimal adjustment to the steady state is equal to xl opt , while xl pc is the adjustment rate
to the steady state under constant taxes (including laissez-faire). From Lemma 3, it then directly
follows that if g > (<)q , xl opt < (>)xl pc. Next, define t˜R,li (t) as the t˜Ri (t) that implements a
given l . Then, under perfect competition, by (24) and (27), t˜R,li (t) = [(q  1+l )/h ] h˜Ri (t) with
h˜Ri (t) = h˜
R
i (0)e
 xl t . The term within square brackets is increasing in l , and, by definition, equal to
zero for l = l pc. Thus, for l = l opt , t˜R,li (t) is positive (negative) and falling over time whenever
l opt > l pc and h˜Ri (0)> (<)0. By Lemma 3 l opt > l pc whenever g < q . Similarly, for l = l opt ,
t˜R,li (t)< (>)0 and rising (falling) over time if g > q and h˜Ri (0)> (<)0 while t˜
R,l
i (t) = 0 for all t
if g = q .
A.2.6 Proof to Proposition 3
First, the optimal adjustment to the steady state is equal to xl opt , while xlmc is the ad-
justment rate to the steady state under constant taxes (including laissez-faire). From Lemma
3, it then directly follows that if max{g,q} > 0, xl opt < xlmc. Next, define t˜R,li (t) as
the t˜Ri (t) that implements a given l . Then, under monopolists, by (24) and (28), t˜
R,l
i (t) =
1
h
"
(q 1)
h
(r+x )+x qh 1
i
+l (r+xl )
(r+x )+x qh 1
#
r+x
r+x (1+l ) h˜
R
i (t), with h˜
R
i (t) = h˜
R
i (0)e
 xl t . The term within square
brackets is increasing in l , and, by definition, equal to zero for l = lmc. By Lemma 3, if
max{g,q} > (=)0, l opt < (=)lmc and the bracketed term is negative (zero) for l = l opt . As
t! •, h˜Ri (t) converges to zero, and so will t˜iR,l (t) for l = l opt .
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A.3 Additional results
A.3.1 Closed-form solutions for lmc and l opt
From (A.18) and Rmc (lmc) = 0 I find the following closed-form solution for lmc:
lmc =
r
r2 4x (q  1)
h
(r+x )+x qh 1
i
 r
2x
. (A.23)
Similarly I find the following closed-form solution for l opt using (A.22) and Ropt (l opt) = 0:
l opt =
p
r2 4x (q  1) [r+x (1  g)] r
2x
. (A.24)
A.3.2 Proof to d (xl opt)/dx > 0
The effect of a change in x on the adjustment speed xl opt is equal to d (xl opt)/dx = l opt +
x (dl opt/dx ). From Appendix (A.2.3) I know dl optdx =  
(l opt)2 (1 q)(1 g)
r+2xl opt . This allows me to
rewrite d (xl opt)/dx as d(xl
opt)
dx =
l opt [r+xl opt ]+x (1 q)(1 g)
r+2xl opt , and conclude d (xl
opt)/dx > 0.
B Extension: habit formation and production externalities
In this appendix I show how the model can be adapted to explicitly account for the presence of an
externality due to the production of one or multiple goods.45 Optimally correcting the externality
will require introducing a Pigovian tax (or subsidy), which in turn induces consumption to shift
away from highly-taxed goods. I can then show that the optimal policy can be decomposed into
two types of taxes; a time-independent externality tax tE that corrects the production externality,
and a ’habit’ tax tHi that satisfies Propositions 1-3 and, as before, optimally manages the speed at
which consumption moves toward the new steady-state.
Suppose that the production of a good i has an external effect on overall labor productivity,
such that (6) is replaced by
L
✓
1 
Z 1
0
Dicidi
◆
=
Z 1
0
dicidi. (B.1)
Here, Di denotes the size of the external effect due to good i. If Di is positive, the production of
good i imposes a negative externality; the externality is positive if Di < 0 and absent if Di = 0. To
ensure consumption remains bounded, I require di+DiL> 0 for all i.
45As I consider a closed economy, production is equal to consumption, and the production externality can be rein-
terpreted as a consumption externality. To avoid any confusion with the consumption/habit internality, I will discuss
the results in the context of a production externality only.
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Suppose that initially, no policy is in place to correct the externality. Then, equations (7)-(16)
continue to apply, while (17) and (18) are replaced by
c⇤i = cR⇤i
Z 1
0
(di+DiL)cR⇤i di
  1
L, (B.2)
and
C⇤ =
Z 1
0
 
cR⇤i
 h 1+q
h di
 h 1+q
h
Z 1
0
(di+DiL)cR⇤i di
  1
L, (B.3)
respectively. The presence of a negative externality (Di > 0) reduces overall labor productivity,
and thereby steady-state consumption c⇤i for all goods i. Conversely, positive externalities (Di < 0),
increase steady state c⇤i and C⇤. Equation (19) also continues to apply, now with (B.3) as the
expression for steady-state effective consumption. Concerning the transition to the steady state,
one can show that equations (20)-(25) remain unchanged, which implies Lemmas 1, 2 and 2a still
apply, while (26) is adjusted to
c˜i(t) = c˜Ri (t) 
R 1
0 (di+DiL)cR⇤i c˜Ri (t)diR 1
0 (di+DiL)cR⇤i di
. (B.4)
When the production of certain goods imposes an externality on aggregate labor productiv-
ity, consumption patterns may not be first-best, even in steady-state. To determine the first-best
consumption allocation, I again maximize (29), now subject to (1)-(5) and (B.1). This gives the
following rule for optimal prices:
pi(t) = µˇL(t) [di+DiL] x µˇhi(t), (B.5)
where µˇhi is still specified as in the main text (equation (31)). This in turn allows me to solve for
the optimal steady-state good i price:
p⇤i = µˇ⇤L [di+DiL]
r+x
r+x (1  g) . (B.6)
In can then prove the following proposition, which replaces Proposition 1:46
Proposition B1 In steady state, laissez-faire consumption choices are optimal if only if Di/di =
D j/d j for all i, j2 [0,1]. A relative tax that satisfies tR⇤i = 1+(Di/di)L1+(Db/db)L implements optimal steady-
state consumption.
Proof By (B.6), the optimal relative price in steady state satisfies pR⇤i =
di+DiL
db+DbL . This is equal to
(16) iff tR⇤i =
1+(Di/di)L
1+(Db/db)L
. Under laissez faire, ti = 1 for all i, so tR⇤i = 1. Then the laissez-faire tR⇤i
46In fact, Proposition 1 can be considered a special case of Proposition B1.
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is equal to the first-best tR⇤i iff Di/di = D j/d j for all i, j2 [0,1].
To determine the optimal path of consumption, prices and habits as consumption transitions
away from good i, I solve for lE,opt , the l for the optimal path in the presence of the production
externality. This lE,opt can then be used in (35) and (36) to determine the value of t˜Ri (t) required
to implement the optimal transition path under perfect competition and monopolistic supply, re-
spectively. I find that the optimal rate of adjustment is independent of the production externality:
Lemma B1 lE,opt = l opt
Proof Loglinearizing (B.5) around the steady state gives (34). (20)-(25) still, so lE,opt = l opt .
The result that lE,opt = l opt implies that Propositions 2 and 3 continue to apply, and the t˜Ri
required to implement the optimal consumption path under perfect competition and monopolistic
supply are still characterized by (35) and (36) with l = l opt , respectively. Put differently, even
though the production externality affects the tax that implements optimal steady-state consumption,
it does not affect the optimal adjustment path to the steady state and thus the path of taxes, t˜Ri ,
required to implement it. Hence, the optimal corrective tax can be separated into two parts. The
first part corrects for the external effect on labor productivity. This tax is time-independent. The
second part corrects for habit formation, and changes as the economy moves to its steady-state.
Starting in a steady state with no taxes, the introduction of an optimal corrective tax then sets
in motion a process where consumption shifts away from goods with a relatively high Di. In this
context, the optimal t˜Ri (t) can be interpreted as the discount (or premium) to the optimal long-run
tax that ensure the economy moves toward the new steady-state consumption bundle at its optimal
rate. For example, suppose we start in a steady state with no taxes and 1+(Di/di)L1+(Db/db)L > 1, such that
the optimal steady-state relative tax is positive (tR⇤i > 1). Suppose also that for any h˜Ri (t)> 0, the
optimal t˜Ri (t) is negative. Then, the optimal tax policy would be to introduce a positive tax which
rises over time to the long-run optimal rate tR⇤i .
C Discrete-time setup
Instead of discretizing the pricing rules (10) and (30) (or (B.5)), I rederive them by solving the
discrete-time model ’bottom up’. I solve the more general setup presented in Appendix B. By
setting all Di = 0, all results can be directly compared to their counterparts in Sections 4 to 6.
Note that in this setup, as discussed in Appendix B, all Lemmas, as well as Propositions 2 and 3,
continue to apply and we can interpret the numerical results referring to these analytical results.
In discrete time, (1)-(4), (B.1) and (7)-(8) still apply. The equation of motion for habits is
replaced by
hit+1 = xcit +(1 x )hit , (C.1)
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where the use of time subscripts indicates we now deal with the discrete-time version of the
model. Under perfect competition, pit = di pLttit still. The good i monopolist maximizes
Pit =Ân=•n=t
h
cin (pin  di pLntin)’x=nx=t+1 11+rx
i
, subject to (7) and (C.1) by choosing [cin ]n=•n=t . This
gives the following pricing rule:
pit = di pLtit
h
h 1
24 1  1 xrt+1+x pLt+1tit+1 pLttitpLttit
1+ xrt+1+x
q
h 1
cit+1
hit+1
pit+1
pit  
1 x
rt+1+x
pit+1 pit
pit
35 . (C.2)
The interest rate rt+1 is determined by the consumption Euler equation:
dUt/dCt
Erc[dUt+1/dCt+1] =
1+rt+1
1+r .
As pointed out in footnote 11, further assumptions must be made regarding the representative
consumer’s anticipation of the change in H as the economy transitions to the steady state. For
the numerical application, I have computed the transition for two cases; one where the consumers
anticipate the change in H, and one where they do not. As results are virtually indistinguishable I
only present the latter.47
The policymaker instead chooses the [cin ]n=•i2[0,1],n=t that maximizeWt =Ân=•n=t (1+r)
 (n t)Un ,
subject to (1)-(4), (B.1) and (C.1). This gives the optimal price for good i
pit = dˇiµˇLt
266664
1  1-xrˇt+1+x
⇣ µˇLt+1 µˇLt
µˇLt
⌘
1+ xrˇt+1+x
pit+1
pit
cit+1
hit+1
"
q
h 1  
h
g+ qh 1
i⇣
cit+1
Ct+1
⌘ h 1h ⇣hit+1
Ht+1
⌘h 1
h
#
  1-xrˇt+1+x
⇣
pit+1 pit
pit
⌘
377775 ,
(C.3)
where I define dˇi ⌘ di + DiL, and rˇt+1 is now determined by the discrete-time Euler equation
dUt/dCt
dUt+1/dCt+1
= 1+rˇt+11+r . A comparison of (C.2) to (10), and (C.3) to (30), reveals two differences
between the continuous and discrete-time pricing rules.
First, in continuous time, the denominator features the instantaneous ratio of good-specific con-
sumption to habits, ci(t)/hi(t), while in discrete time this is the t+ 1 ratio cit+1/hit+1, multiplied
by the ratio of time t + 1 to time t good-specific prices. Similarly, for the discrete-time optimal
price (C.3), C and H are evaluated at time t+1, while in continuous time we have C(t) and H(t).
This can be explained as follows. In continuous time, the habit adjustment occurs instantaneously.
Hence to evaluate the value of the habit, instantaneous consumption, habits and prices are relevant.
In discrete time, it is the next-period habit that adjusts, and thus next-period consumption, habit
and prices are used to determine the value of investing in the habit. In both cases, the value of the
habit is then evaluated relative to current prices.
Second, in the discrete-time pricing rules, the future change in taxes and prices are multiplied
47This is not surprising. The shock I consider is one that is relatively small, and applies to a small share of goods.
Hence, even if shifts in cRi are large, shifts inC and H, and hence r, are expected to be small.
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by an additional 1  x . This is intuitive. In the discrete-time model, if x = 1, habits fully adjust
from one period to another and the decision maker only needs to know the value of habits one
period ahead. Hence, for x = 1, future changes in the value of the habit, captured by the change
in prices (net of taxes), become irrelevant and drop out. In the continuous-time pricing rules, (10)
and (30), this full adjustment from one instant to another occurs if x !•. Here again, future price
and tax changes drop out. Note that where any x   0 can be rationalized in the continuous time
model, in the discrete-time model only x 2 [0, 1] are sensical.
C.1 Additional details for numerical results
I use the Dynare package version 4.4 to solve the model numerically.
I assume the charge optimally corrects for a production externality, as in Appendix B. Put
differently, I assume that for ’unhealthy foods’, Di = 0.1 while Di = 0 for all other goods (see
Proposition B1 and (C.3)), and that in the initial steady-state relative consumption and habits equal
unity. The difference between the welfare gains including and excluding the benefit from correcting
the production externality comes from a difference in initial steady states. In the former case, I
assume Di = 0.1 already prior to the implementation of policy, implying the initial steady state
was distorted. In the latter, I consider an initial steady state that was undistorted: prior to t = 0,
Di = 0 for all i. Here, the charge is implemented immediately in response to an increase in Di to
0.1 for i 2 [0,n] at t = 0. Initial relative prices and consumption, as well as the new steady state are
identical in both cases, yet due to the noninternalized production externality, initial consumption
levels are lower in the former case.
All transition paths presented in this paper resemble the case where the initial steady state is
distorted. To determine gains for the alternative case, I compute all transition paths again. Results
for cRi , p
R
i and t
opt
i are virtually indistinguishable.
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D Additional figures
Figure D.1: Sensitivity analysis, cRi
The curves depict responses to the unanticipated introduction of the 10 percent charge at t = 0, where I assume the
economy is in steady state for all t < 0. Responses are shown for a good i 2 [0,n] relative to any good b 2 (n,1].
Figure D.2: Sensitivity analysis, pRi
The curves depict responses to the unanticipated introduction of the 10 percent charge at t = 0, where I assume the
economy is in steady state for all t < 0. Responses are shown for a good i 2 [0,n] relative to any good b 2 (n,1].
Figure D.3: Sensitivity analysis, topti
The curves depict responses to the unanticipated introduction of the 10 percent charge at t = 0, where I assume the
economy is in steady state for all t < 0. Responses are shown for a good i 2 [0,n] relative to any good b 2 (n,1].
